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This article uses philosopher Miranda Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice to shed
light on the legal concept of the fiduciary, alongside demonstrating the wider
contribution Fricker’s work can make to business ethics. Fiduciary, from the Latin
fīdūcia, meaning “trust,” plays a fundamental role in all financial and business
organisations: it acts as a moral safeguard of the relationship between trustee and
beneficiary. The article focuses on the ethics of the fiduciary, but from a unique
historical perspective, referring back to the original formulation of the fiduciary
within a familial context to investigate presuppositions regarding agential capabil-
ities, whilst also paying attention to the power mechanism embedded in the trustee–
beneficiary relationship. Using Fricker’s theory of pre-emptive testimonial injus-
tice, the analysis elucidates the impact of cumulative beneficiary silencing in
contemporary contexts, and the article uncovers ethical issues of an epistemological
kind at the core of the fiduciary—of epistemic injustice.
Key Words: fiduciary duty, epistemic injustice, Ethics of Care, shareholder
activism, power, gender
T he legal concept of fiduciary, from the Latin fīdūcia, meaning “trust,” plays afundamental role in all financial and business organisations, as well as govern-
ing other professional relationships, including medical care. Fiduciary acts as a
safeguard of the relationship between trustee and beneficiary, ensuring that the
beneficiaries’ best interests are met. The extent of the embeddedness of this legal
concept in international financial and business architecture should not be under-
estimated. It has facilitated the ownership and movement of wealth through protec-
tion of capital and has undoubtedly played a leading role in the success of capitalism.
Consequently, and as will become clear, the contribution of a critical analysis of the
fiduciary has far-reaching implications for business ethics theory and practice.
There are a number of ongoing debates regarding the fiduciary, including whether
the fiduciary comprises ethical and/or legal aspects (Laby 2005) and, specifically
within an investment context, whether the fiduciary can accommodate socially
responsible or ethical investment decisions being made by trustees on behalf of
beneficiaries (Sandberg 2011, 2013; Richardson 2011). This article also focuses on
the ethical aspect, but does so from a unique and historical perspective, going back to
the original formulation of the fiduciary within a familial context not only to reveal
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why a duty of care plays a central role in the fiduciary but also to uncover key
foundational presuppositions regarding agential capabilities embedded in the
trustee–beneficiary relationship. In doing so, the article uncovers crucial ethical
issues of an epistemological kind at the core of the fiduciary.
The article builds on existing work on the power relationship implicit in the
fiduciary and its historical origins in gender relations (Richardson 2011; Mussell
2020) by using philosopher Miranda Fricker’s (2009) insightful theory of epistemic
injustice to explicate the position of the beneficiary. Fricker’s work—as will become
clear—offers the potential to make a significant contribution to business ethics
owing to its focus on explicating epistemically excluded agents. These could include
silenced stakeholders, excluded employees, or unconsulted shareholders—and as
will be shown, all of these agents could be beneficiaries. This article, then, provides
one example of how Fricker’s work can be used to shine a light on a fundamental
legal concept underpinning financial and business organisations.
By applying Fricker’s theory of pre-emptive testimonial injustice to the position
of the silenced beneficiary—whereby an agent’s testimony is not only discredited
due to implicit or explicit bias against the agent’s identity but his or her testimony is
not even sought because of his or her identity—the article confronts the foundations
of the dyadic relationship at the core of the legal concept of the fiduciary. The
application of Fricker’s theory of pre-emptive testimonial injustice to the role of the
beneficiary is also shown to help elucidate a number of contemporary issues where
the fiduciary arrangement is prevalent—thus demonstrating the wide contribution
her work can make to the field of business ethics. The first of these concerns why
there are so few women in position of trusteeship. The second focuses on the
increasing yet still relatively low levels of shareholder activism and engagement,
or active ownership, of shareholders demanding their voices be heard. By theorising
their silencing as pre-emptive testimonial injustice, the article highlights how share-
holder activism is in fact rooted in issues concerning epistemic injustice. In light of
this angle of the argument, the application of Fricker’s thinking in the context of the
article makes a significantly wide contribution to business ethics—not only to the
literature focussing on fiduciary, corporate governance, and ethics (Gold andMilller
2014; Goldstone, McLennan, and Whitaker 2013; Miller 2014, 2018; Richardson
2011) but also to the body of work investigating shareholder activism (Fairfax 2019;
Goodman and Arenas 2015; Cundill, Smart, and Wilson 2018; Coskun et al. 2018).
Widening the analysis beyond the two specific examples—to take into account the
extreme extent to which the fiduciary arrangement is embedded in our financial
systems—the implications of Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice for rethinking
our current financial institutions, systems, and structures are discussed. Final
thoughts regarding whether the fiduciary is in fact future-fit in light of the article’s
revelations are outlined.
1. STRUCTURE
To successfully demonstrate howMiranda Fricker’s work can be used to contribute
to business ethics by investigating epistemic injustice in the fiduciary, a brief
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introduction to existing work in the field of Kantian and Ethics of Care fiduciary
ethics is outlined in Section 2. Alongside this, the importance of taking into account
the historical development of the fiduciary, in order to understand the position of the
beneficiary that Fricker’s theory will elucidate, is emphasised. Lastly, the agential
presuppositions implicit in the roles of trustee and beneficiary and the resultant
power imbalance between the two positions are considered, laying the groundwork
for the following sections’ discussion, which constitutes the central focus of the
article.
Section 3 engages with the position of the silenced beneficiary and further
unpacks the aforementioned agential presuppositions. Miranda Fricker’s theory of
epistemic injustice and pre-emptive testimonial injustice are introduced, and their
suitability for explicating the role of the beneficiary is highlighted. The implications
and consequences of the epistemic exclusion or silencing of an epistemic agent are
discussed.
The fourth and final section brings fiduciary back into a contemporary context.
Drawing on insights from Fricker’s work on the impact of cumulative pre-emptive
testimonial injustice on epistemic agents—of persistently excluding their testimo-
nies—an analysis of two contemporary contexts inwhich the fiduciary is prevalent is
offered. The first of these examines the persistent gender disparity in positions of
trusteeship held by women. The second focusses on shareholder activism and active
ownership, and the argument is advanced that one reason for such activism is
pushback rooted in issues concerning epistemic injustice. A discussion of the
normative impact of the fiduciary relationship, how this ties to shareholder apathy,
andwhat increasing shareholder activism reveals about this normativity are outlined.
This discussion then leads to the crucial recognition that in light of the preceding
revelations regarding the epistemic injustice embedded in the fiduciary, we must
recognise the extent to which our financial structures and systems—in which the
fiduciary in turn is fully embedded—are in fact embodiments of pre-emptive testi-
monial injustice.
Finally, the case is made that a future-fit fiduciary—or alternative arrangement—
requires a realist rethink of agential capabilities, a re-emphasis on the trustee–
beneficiary relationship, and a revisit to the good care ethics central to fiduciary.
2. THE FIDUCIARY: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO ETHICAL
AND HISTORICAL ASPECTS
2.1 A Kantian Framework for the Fiduciary
A brief introduction to existing work in fiduciary ethics is necessary to lay the
groundwork for the following analysis and to show how Fricker’s contribution
builds on and extends this ethical project. Work in this area has primarily focussed
on the twin fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. Couched in the terminology of duty,
a Kantian deontological framework is often used to explicate the fiduciary. Scholars
proposing such an approach (Samet 2014; Laby 2005) focus on Kant’s work con-
cerning the duty of virtue, and their discussions include debates regarding whether
the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care can be regarded as virtues. Laby’s work goes
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a little further. He uses Kant’s discussion to argue that both the judicial (loyalty) and
ethical (care) aspects of the fiduciary contain a duty of virtue, and in doing so, he
shores up arguments against increasing claims that the fiduciary is purely contractual
and without ethical premises (Getzler 2014; Lydenberg 2014).1 He also draws
attention to the importance of recognising changing historical legal contexts, noting
that “a legal duty according to Kant, is not merely a legal duty as many use the term
today, it is a moral duty that may be enforced by law” (Laby 2005, 3). The upshot of
this for modern-day claims that the judicial aspect of fiduciary is amoral is that they
fail to take into account that juridical laws also include the duty of virtue—they are a
moral duty.
The use of a Kantian duty of virtue is then helpful in stemming the increasing
erosion of fiduciary ethics, whilst also highlighting that the spirit of this legal
concept is indeed ethical—important in the light of using Fricker’s inherently ethical
project. However, what is seemingly absent from thework of such scholars is awider
recognition of the socio-historical development of the fiduciary, including the
conditions under which fiduciary relationships originated. Consequently, the source
of the power dynamic embedded between trustees and beneficiaries and the long-
term normative implications of this dynamic that Fricker’s workwill crucially reveal
are overlooked, as are the related presuppositions regarding the agential capabilities
of both parties. It is to these points that the focus now briefly turns.
2.2 An Ethics of Care Framework for the Fiduciary
As per the position defended elsewhere (seeMussell 2020), an investigation into the
evolution of this legal concept—with particular attention paid to the implicit power
mechanism embedded in the fiduciary relationship and its gendered origins—
reveals a great deal regarding its ethical narrative and points towards why care
(notwithstanding wide interpretations thereof) is fundamental to the fiduciary. This
focus on power is particularly important for the following use of Fricker’s theory,
which holds a conception of social power and its (mis)uses at its core.
Originally formulatedwithin English common (familial) law as ameans to protect
property put into trust while the rightful (male) owner of the property2 was absent,
for example, fighting in the Crusades, beneficiaries were women and children,
1The erosion of fiduciary ethics on the grounds that the judicial aspect of fiduciary is purely contractual is
widely held to be the result of a neoclassical economic reading and influence on this legal concept. Laby’s
(2005, 1) observation that “over the past twenty years, law and economics scholars have argued that fiduciary
duties can best be explained through the lens of contract” aligns with observations made by authors such as
Getzler (2014), who pinpoints the Chicago School of Economics economist Ronald Coase as a central scholar
guiding a “shift in the intellectual commitments of the legal caste” (Getzler 2014, 8) and of Steve Lydenberg
(2014), who writes regarding constraining economic interpretations of the fiduciary.
2 It should be noted that coverture (colloquially known as civil death) prevented English women from
ownership of personal property upon marriage (personal property included money, stocks, furniture, jew-
ellery, livestock, etc.) and also placed the control of their real property (housing and land), including rights to
income earned from its lease, into their husbands’ control (although the husband could not sell the property, as
the wife retained legal ownership). Coverture was law from circa the twelfth century until 1870, when the
Married Women’s Property Act was passed. It should be noted that, in contrast, feme sole were legally
permitted to own and control their own personal and real property. For further details, see Combs (2005).
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allocated passive and subordinated roles. As the lawyer Benjamin Richardson
(2011, 6) writes, “trusts arose in England primarily to protect family wealth and
to provide for the wife and children, who were socially constructed as passive and
dependent. Modern investment law transplanted these arrangements for the private
trust into a very different context.”With this historical context in mind, the fiduciary
arrangement can be seen to have been devised as a substitute for a familial relation-
ship, one supposedly underpinned by care and taking placewithin the private sphere.
Arguably, then, a more suitable ethical framework for explicating the ethics of
fiduciary is an Ethics of Care (seeMussell 2020). This contemporary body of ethical
theory originates from the work of Carol Gilligan, who sought to redress what she
deemed to be biased studies in moral developmental psychology influenced by
value-laden theory underpinned by certain interpretations of Kantian thinking—
prioritising individualist-, rights-, and principle-centred ethics. Gilligan’s work
instead identified a different moral conception, and her work was noted for its
other-regarding focus, highlighting interdependency and interconnection, and for
being explicitly underpinned by a relational epistemology and ontology.
What arguably comes to the fore when thinking through the historical ethical
development of the fiduciary using an Ethics of Care is that the trustee and bene-
ficiary are clearly positioned within an interconnected relationship. The inherently
relational Ethics of Care framework provides the potential to reframe the fiduciary as
a relationship, not just as a duty. Speculating onwhy fiduciary has come to be known
as a duty despite its origins as a substitute familial connection, Richardson highlights
the role that the beneficiaries’ subordination has played in this transformation from
relationship to duty. He writes that “the idea that there is a relationship between the
parties has been obscured because traditionally trust law cast beneficiaries into a
passive role.… They traditionally have not enjoyed unqualified rights to be con-
sulted or to instruct trustees on how they should undertake their responsibilities in
the absence of legislative provisions” (Richardson 2011, 6).
This is a crucial observation to note in light of the following analysis using
Fricker’s work, and the normative implications of beneficiaries not enjoying unqual-
ified rights to be consulted—which Fricker’s theory crucially exposes—will become
clear. Richardson’s comment also points directly at the causal role that presuppo-
sitions regarding the trustee and beneficiaries’ agential capabilities, and the ensuing
silencing of the beneficiary, has played in eroding the connection and relationship
between the two fiduciary parties. Put differently, Richardson is claiming that the
subordination of beneficiaries has not only undermined the fiduciary as a relation-
ship but led to its evolution as being conceptualised as a disconnected duty. The
reasoning behind why beneficiaries were cast into a passive, subordinated, and
silenced role has been explored in detail elsewhere (Mussell 2020), but in brief,
the presuppositions regarding agential capabilities embedded in the fiduciary are
founded in false gender stereotypes that damage both men and women. These are
stereotypes that often fall back onto trite dichotomies, constructing gendered iden-
tities along the now well-recognised erroneous lines of reason–emotion, rational–
irrational, male–female, and so on, with an inherent hierarchy embedded in each
dichotomy favouring themale-associated trait. The result of these presuppositions in
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the context of fiduciary has been an asymmetrical power dynamic embedded in its
structure. Beneficiaries have not only had decision-making capacity removed but
they have also been silenced within the fiduciary relationship. Trustees are not
obliged to consult with beneficiaries to enquire of their needs or best interests,
and as such, not only is their testimony deemed extraneous to the decision-making
process but it is not even sought. It is to the task of considering the ethics of this
silenced and excluded situation, and the light that Fricker’s theory can shine on it,
that we now turn.
3. THE SILENCED AND UNSOUGHT
As has been acknowledged in section 2, aspects of the Kantian fiduciary project are
admirable for shoring up the ethical aspects of the fiduciary, successfully arguing
that the remit of fiduciary reaches beyond the purely contractual and judicial. By
arguing that both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care carry an ethical component,
thereby laying the groundwork for the need to identify an ethical framework for
fiduciary, solid ground is provided on which to lay out an alternative ethical
explication of the fiduciary using the Ethics of Care. That said, the omission of
the Kantian fiduciary project to go deeper and questionwhy the beneficiary was even
deemed to be in need of a trustee results in a failure to build in an account of why the
beneficiary is essentially silenced and rendered voiceless or, in Richardson’s terms,
why beneficiaries “have not enjoyed unqualified rights to be consulted.” These sorts
of ethical questions, and the highlighted ensuing implications, sit squarely within the
domain of epistemology. These are questions concerning the sort of knowledge
individuals are presupposed to have, how and why they have such knowledge, the
status afforded to knowledge, and whose opinion or testimony is sought as a result.
And intersecting these lines of epistemological enquiry and the answers they evoke
are ethical considerations. As a result, and to further investigate the outlined power
dynamic inherent in the trustee–beneficiary relationship—particularly in light of the
historical and gendered readings of its development—the work of the philosopher
Miranda Fricker, specifically her book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of
Knowing (2009), is particularly useful in this context.
Fricker’s work in the area of epistemology and ethics, which draws together
epistemology and conceptualisations of justice, addresses a previous lacuna in the
literature connecting the two fields. Her project sets out two central ideas of how
social power and social disadvantage can result in epistemic injustice. One of these
ideas Fricker terms as hermeneutical injustice—an ethical issue that arises when
neither the epistemic agent (teller) nor the listener (receiver) is equipped with the
necessary concepts to understand the situation or communication. The second idea
Fricker outlines in her book is testimonial injustice.
3.1 A Note on the Application of Fricker’s Theory
Before moving on to outline Fricker’s theory, a brief word regarding its application
would be beneficial. As already highlighted, Fricker’s work helped address a lacuna
in the ethics–epistemology literature, connecting the two fields via considerations of
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social power. But this does not mean that a spotlight had not previously been
shone on the social power interplay affecting epistemologies and positions of
knowing. Indeed, Fricker is clear in pointing out that “a crucial attraction of
postmodernist philosophical thought was that it placed reason and knowledge
firmly in the context of social power” (Fricker 2009, 2). However, and as Fricker
notes, rather than continuing to direct analysis at understanding how reason had
come to be wielded as a weapon of power by the powerful, postmodernist thought
instead continued down the track of critiquing reason itself. For Fricker, it is this
choice of direction that has left an all-important gap in the knowledge of the
degree to which reason has come to be used as a weapon, a gap she calls to be
filled:
But we must not allow there to be mere silence where there was once a postmodernist
buzz, for we can surely find other, better ways of discussing reason’s entanglements with
social power. What form, we might ask, should such discussion take? One answer to this
question is that it should take the form of asking first-order ethical questions in the context
of socially situated accounts of our epistemic practices. A socially situated account of a
human practice is an account such that the participants are conceived not in abstraction
from relations of social power (as they are in traditional epistemology, including most
social epistemology) but as operating as social types who stand in relations of power to
one another. This socially situated conception makes questions of power and its some-
times rational, sometimes counter-rational rhythms arise naturally as we try to account for
the epistemic practice itself (Fricker 2009, 3, emphasis added).
The analysis being undertaken here of the silencing of the beneficiary in both
historical and contemporary fiduciary relationships is arguably doing just as Fricker
suggests. It is asking first-order ethical questions in the context of socially situated
accounts of our epistemic practices and directly looking at social types who stand in
relations of power to one another. This is a line of questioning Kantian fiduciary
scholars have omitted from their ethical analyses, and it is a line of ethical ques-
tioning that sits at the very core of understanding the fiduciary relationship and its
embedded social power.
3.2 Epistemic Injustice and Social Power
Fricker is explicit about the extent of the importance of the epistemic theory she
outlines, noting that “the wrong of testimonial injustice cuts conceptually deeper
than anything we had so far envisaged: a matter of exclusion from the very
practice that constitutes the practical core of what it is to know” (Fricker 2009,
6). Carefully laying the conceptual groundwork of her project, Fricker launches
her explanation of testimonial injustice with an initial discussion surrounding the
definition of social power on which her project draws. The conception she uses is
particularly useful to include here for two reasons: not only does it provide a richer
explanation of Fricker’s theory but it also serves to deliver the conceptual work of
explaining the social power embedded in the relational infrastructure of the
fiduciary. Summarising the concept she will put to work, Fricker defines social
power as
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a practically socially situated capacity to control others’ actions, where this capacity may
be experienced (actively or passively) by particular social agents, or alternatively, it may
operate purely structurally (Fricker 2009, 13).
In light of the fact that the fiduciary is premised on the arrangement that the trustee
should act in the best interest of the beneficiary without the need for their prior
consultation, and the fact that trustees are charged with making decisions on the
beneficiaries’ behalf, we can see how Fricker’s concept of social power is at play in
the fiduciary relationship. But the extent of this social power becomes all the more
apparent when we also consider the first social context in which Fricker puts the
social power concept to work—in identity power.
Choosing gender as one example of identity criteria, Fricker highlights how “an
exercise of gender identity power is active when, for instance, a man makes (possibly
unintended) use of his identity as aman to influence awoman’s actions—for example,
to make her defer to his word” (Fricker 2009, 14). This role that identity plays in
activating social power in the context of the fiduciary contains significantweightwhen
we consider, as has already been highlighted, that original trustees were male, thereby
clearly exercising their identity power. But it holds additional weight when we also
consider how contemporary judiciary decide if a fiduciary duty was ever present, as,
for example, in times of dispute. In his paper, in which he attempts to lay out some
guiding principles for identifying fiduciary relationships,Miller (2018, 7–8, emphasis
added) notes the predominant use of twomethods of identification—status-based and
fact-based reasoning—outlining how the former tends to be the “default” position:
The prevalence of status reasoning is reflected in conventional wisdom about fiduciary
law: one tends to think of fiduciary principles as attaching to persons by virtue of the legal
or social role or position they occupy. Thus, we say that trustees, directors, agents,
lawyers, and doctors are fiduciaries, and so too, by implication, we attach a fiduciary
characterization to the relationships in which these persons perform their roles.
WhatMiller is arguably alluding to here is the social power implicitly afforded by
judiciary to certain individuals by way of the legal or social roles they occupy, based
on the social status such roles supposedly convey. And as has been highlighted
elsewhere (Mussell 2020), it is roles that are deemed to hold reason as a central tenet
that are afforded the social status Miller describes. This is both Fricker’s identity
power and “reason’s entanglements with social power” in action.When we consider
the asymmetrical power embedded in the fiduciary relationship—where beneficia-
ries are left unconsulted—we can start to see how social power accumulates. But
what Miller is also arguably alluding to is the credibility that these social roles carry.
It is this (arguably reason-based) credibility—afforded to individuals byway of their
identity power from occupying certain social roles—which ties back into Fricker’s
main theory of testimonial injustice. I now explain how.
3.3 Fricker’s Testimonial Injustice
Having introduced identity power into her argument, Fricker then moves on to
explaining its importance in the context of testimonial injustice, as well as
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highlighting the central role that stereotype plays in identity power. She is clear to
note why identity power is an important and helpful epistemic device, allowing
hearers to “use social stereotypes as heuristics in their spontaneous assessments of
their interlocutor’s credibility” (Fricker 2009, 16–17), and acknowledges that the
use of stereotypes may in fact be proper and need not be detrimental. But Fricker’s
project is concerned with injustice, and as such, she draws attention to the effect and
impact that a stereotype working against the speaker can have.When such prejudice
is at play, she notes that “two things follow: there is an epistemic dysfunction in the
exchange—the hearer makes an unduly deflated judgement of the speaker’s cred-
ibility … and the hearer does something ethically bad—the speaker is wrongfully
undermined in her capacity as a knower” (Fricker 2009, 17).
We have already seen, as per Miller, how identity power can work in an agent’s
favour and produce what Fricker terms a credibility excess. The status-based rea-
soning used by judiciary to identify fiduciary relationships is an example of this. But
as is Fricker’s concern, the focus in this article is on the credibility deficit that occurs
as a result of an “unduly deflated judgement of the speaker’s credibility,” the
testimonial injustice to which it leads, and the wider implications for the epistemic
agent violated as a result.
Bringing this back to the context of the beneficiary, it is helpful to remind
ourselves of the social roles or positions that the original familial beneficiaries—
women and children—were afforded and to consider the identity power and cred-
ibility excesses or deficits associated with those roles. To recall Richardson’s
observation, “trusts arose in England primarily to protect family wealth and to
provide for the wife and children, who were socially constructed as passive and
dependent.”As such, the beneficiaries of these trusts were women and children, and
their social construction as passive and dependent was reinforced through the social
roles and associated status the roles afforded. Specifically with regard to beneficiary
wives, their dependency was premised on erroneous gender stereotypes simulta-
neously set within and arguably reinforced by a judicial system in which the legal
doctrine of coverture existed—whereby a woman’s legal right to own certain
property was rescinded once she married (see Combs 2005; Erickson 2005). Cov-
erture requires highlighting in this context of identifying epistemic injustice in the
fiduciary, including identity power and credibility deficit, for a number of reasons—
not only because of the role it played in defining married women’s rights to property
ownership, thereby reinforcing dependency and positioning them as beneficiaries,
but also because of the fallacious stereotypes it exposes when we note how feme
sole, or unmarried women, were legally entitled to own both personal and real
property and considered capable of making their own investment and financial
decisions in its regard.
With this fallacious and inconsistent gender stereotype in the original fiduciary
helpfully exposed, and the effect this has on ensuing identity power and credibility
deficit highlighted, we can now move nearer towards identifying the specific sort of
epistemic injustice embedded in the original fiduciary relationship as a sort of
testimonial injustice—“a kind of injustice in which someone iswronged specifically
in her capacity as a knower” (Fricker 2009, 20). This is a helpful honing of the
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subject matter. We are now starting to narrow down why an epistemic agent is
discredited (owing to identity power and associated credibility deficit) and what,
epistemically speaking, is being discredited (the agent’s capacity as a knower). If we
then contextualise this “capacity as knower” into the context of the fiduciary, and
take into account Miller’s point that trustees are often identified by judiciary using
status-based reasoning and that the social roles judged as indicating the presence of a
fiduciary relationship are deemed as involving high levels of reasoning capability,
then the extension of this argument is that beneficiaries supposedly have less of this
reasoning capacity and so are in need of the trustees to act on their behalf. Going a
step further by taking into account the now much-maligned gender stereotypes of
male-reason/female-emotion, alongside the well-established critiques of the con-
struction of reason, such as Genevieve Lloyd’s (1984) The Man of Reason, which
argued that reason has been developed as an ideal constructed through the image of
maleness, we start to see how female beneficiaries’ credibility deficit specifically
pertained to a perceived lack of reasoning capacity. And this of course takes us back
to Fricker’s earlier point of “asking first-order ethical questions in the context of
socially situated accounts of our epistemic practices” to investigate and expose
“reason’s entanglements with social power.”
But the analysis does not stop here. Because to recall, within the fiduciary
relationship, the trustee is not required to consult with the beneficiary, and despite
the trustee being taskedwith acting in the beneficiaries’ best interests, an articulation
of their best interests is not requested. In short, the beneficiaries’ testimony is not
sought.
3.4 Fricker’s Pre-emptive Testimonial Injustice
Whilst the core of Fricker’s project is to deliver the theory of testimonial injustice,
she also introduces readers to what she terms pre-emptive testimonial injustice. This
branch of testimonial injustice is arguably best placed to explain the epistemic
injustice of the silenced beneficiary within the fiduciary relationship.
Connectingwith the previous point that testimonial injustice refers to an epistemic
agent wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower, Fricker uses the work of
Edward Craig—explicitly Knowledge and the State of Nature (1990), in which he
seeks to elucidate whywe have the concept of knowledge—to focus on the construct
of the knower or, specifically, the “good informant.” For Craig, “the explanation of
why we have the concept of knowledge is that it arises from our fundamental need to
distinguish good informants: originally, knowledge is what good informants can be
relied on to share with us” (Fricker 2009, 130). Taking this a step further, Craig
outlines the three different aspects that constitute a good informant as someone who
can be relied on to share his or her knowledge, and Fricker helpfully summarises
these as follows:
Someone who (1) is likely enough in the context to be right about what you want
to know, (2) is communicatively open (principally, sincere) in what he tells you,
and (3) bears indicator properties so that you can recognize that (1) and (2) are satisfied
(130).
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It this third aspect of indicator properties that is of interest here, specifically in
light of the previous discussions surrounding identity power and the credibility
deficits associated with certain social identities and roles. As we have seen, gender
is a well-known example of identity power. And as has been shown, women were
(and clearly still are in certain contexts) socially positioned in passive and subordi-
nated roles and subject to credibility deficits. Taking these two aspects together,
alongside noting that within the fiduciary relationship, the trustee need not consult
with the beneficiary or ask his or her opinion, we can conclude that the beneficiary is
silenced and subjected to a related but different form of testimonial injustice. As
Fricker (2009, 130, emphasis added) writes,
those social groups who are subject to identity prejudice and are thereby susceptible to
unjust credibility deficit will, by the same token, also tend simply not to be asked to share
their thoughts, their judgements, their opinions.… This kind of testimonial injustice takes
place in silence. It occurs when hearer prejudice does its work in advance of a potential
informational exchange: it pre-empts any such exchange. Let us call it pre-emptive
testimonial injustice. The credibility of such a person on a given subject matter is already
sufficiently in prejudicial deficit that their potential testimony is never solicited; so the
speaker is silenced by the identity prejudice that undermines her credibility in advance.
Thus purely structural operations of identity power can control whose would-be contri-
butions become public, and whose do not.
To be clear, by not consulting with the beneficiary, who within the setting of the
original familial fiduciarywerewomen (and children), the beneficiaries’ testimony is
never solicited; so the speaker is silenced, and this takes place as a result of his or her
identity and perceived credibility deficit. Indeed, by applying Fricker’s pre-emptive
testimonial injustice in this way to such a real-world example, we start to reveal the
fiduciary’s embedded relations of social power in action:
If we turn our imagination to the real social world and place the phenomenon of pre-
emptive testimonial injustice in relations of social power, we readily see how it could
function as a mechanism of silencing: not being asked is one way in which powerless
social groups might be deprived of opportunities to contribute their points of view to
the pool of collective understanding.… Testimonial injustice, then, can silence you by
prejudicially pre-empting your word (Fricker 2009, 131, emphasis added).
The implications of thinking through thismechanism of silence in the context of
the fiduciary carries even more weight when we consider how the construction of
the fiduciary relationship is premised on such silencing: it is embedded in the
fundamental structure of the relationship and delivers the asymmetrical power in
the fiduciary, which has been discussed elsewhere (Mussell 2020). But the impli-
cation of this structural mechanism of silence as an epistemic injustice becomes all
the more significant when we take into account its systematic nature (repeated and
ongoing) and then also consider the resultant cumulative effects of this systematic
use of themechanism. Put differently, what are the long-term effects of deploying a
mechanism of silence, of systematically silencing, and of being systematically
silenced?
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3.5 Consequences of Pre-emptive Testimonial Injustice
With consideration to such implications, Fricker (2009, 145, emphasis added) offers
some helpful reflections in this regard:
No wonder, then, that even relatively inconsequential testimonial injustices can carry a
symbolic weight to the effect that the speaker is less than a full epistemic subject: the
injustice sends the message that they are not fit for participation in the practice that
originally generates the very idea of a knower.
Whilst Fricker’s reflection is certainly helpful in starting to think through the
consequences of testimonial injustice for an epistemic agent more generally, what
she is not doing is focussing on the specific consequences of pre-emptive testimonial
injustice, or indeed on the consequences of its systematic use and therefore cumu-
lative effects. This is an important distinction to make when we consider the context
of the fiduciary relationship being explicated here, which, as we have already seen,
arguably has systematic pre-emptive testimonial injustice as a mechanism of silence
embedded into its structure. However, in the absence of a more specific consider-
ation from Fricker regarding the consequences of (cumulative) pre-emptive testi-
monial injustice on epistemic agents, her more general earlier statement will be
briefly developed and then applied for the purposes of the fiduciary context.
Fricker’s first point worth noting is that even relatively inconsequential testimo-
nial injustices can carry a symbolic weight to the effect that the speaker is less than a
full epistemic subject. What this invites us to do in the context of the fiduciary is
evaluate whether the silencing of the beneficiary is indeed relatively inconsequential
or if it in fact has more far-reaching consequences and so carries more than the
symbolic weight suggested. Considering that the fiduciary relationship exists to
ensure that the beneficiaries’ best interests are met, it is safe to conclude that the
pre-emptive testimonial injustice identified in the fiduciary does indeed have more
far-reaching consequences (the beneficiaries own welfare) and so does in fact carry
more than a symbolic weight regarding the beneficiary being less than a full episte-
mic subject. The outcome of this, as Fricker indicates, is the message that they
(beneficiaries) are not fit for participation in the practice that originally generates
the very idea of a knower, and in the case of pre-emptive testimonial injustice in the
fiduciary, this clearly reflects the actual non-participatory and passive role in which
the beneficiary is indeed permanently placed.
To summarise, whilst Fricker has helpfully engaged in considering the conse-
quences of general testimonial injustice—which have been briefly developed above
to consider the consequences of pre-emptive testimonial injustice—Fricker does
not, however, comment on the possible long-term effects of cumulative pre-emptive
testimonial injustice, of being systematically silenced. As indicated earlier, we can
deduce the effects of pre-emptive testimonial injustice by assuming the same out-
comes Fricker lays out for general testimonial injustice as described, but in the case
of cumulative injustice, we must arguably exacerbate the extent of outcome due to
extended circumstances. By doing so, we arrive at the position that silenced bene-
ficiaries receive the repeated message, over a sustained period of time, that they are
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not fit to participate in the practice that originally generates the very idea of a
knower practice and that they are not therefore a knower in this context.
The consequence of pre-emptive testimonial injustice delivering a reinforced and
exacerbated message to beneficiaries that they are not fit for participation in the
practice that originally generates the very idea of a knower provides a helpful
analytical angle on a number of contemporary issues, specifically the persistent
problem of few women in professional positions that constitute being a trustee and
the widespread low levels of shareholder engagement and activism, both of which
are addressed in the following section.
In addition, however, and again worth highlighting before the more in-depth
discussion unfolds, is the crucial recognition that the application of Fricker’s theory
to the fiduciary relationship is exceptionally revelatory in bringing to the fore the
extent to which pre-emptive testimonial injustice has permeated and fundamentally
embedded itself in our financial systems and structures, the ongoing implications of
which are both deep and far-reaching. It is to these discussions, and what they reveal
of wider systemic injustice, that we now turn.
4. PRE-EMPTIVE TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE
IN CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS
Another brief recap would be helpful at this point, to draw together the previous two
sections and trace how they combine to help investigate ethical aspects embedded in
the fiduciary—with a particular focus on epistemic injustice. To recall, the work of
Kantian fiduciary scholars was first introduced to help shore up the argument that the
fiduciary does indeed contain an ethical dimension. This was an important initial
step to make in light of the increasing arguments made to the contrary, with some
parties instead arguing that the fiduciary is reducible to being purely contractual.
Despite some projects containing identified helpful elements, the seeming omission
of Kantian fiduciary scholars to consider the historical development of the fiduciary,
including questioning why the fiduciary was first devised, results in overlooking the
power dynamic embedded in the relationship between trustees and beneficiaries, one
rooted in gender politics and identity power. Whilst the fiduciary duty of care is
identified as playing a central role, the possibility of utilising an Ethics of Care as an
ethical framework for the fiduciary has been overlooked. By introducing this ethical
framework and highlighting how its relational ontology and epistemology alignwell
with the fiduciary as a relationship, this article, along with other work (Mussell
2020), remedies the issue. In addition, explicitly (re)framing the fiduciary as an
ethical relationship—one unarguably premised on a power asymmetry in which the
trustee makes decisions on behalf of the beneficiary without need for their prior
consultation—helps focus an investigation on the identities and epistemic agency of
the trustee and beneficiary. It raises a new line of questioning—of who gets to decide
for whom, of who is silenced andwhy—and subsequently brings another ethical line
of questioning to the fore, that of epistemic injustice, or, more specifically, pre-
emptive testimonial injustice, embedded in the fiduciary relationship.
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4.1 Updating to Contemporary Contexts
Just as it has been shown to be fruitful to return to the historical foundations of the
fiduciary to explicate the original power mechanism and related agential presupposi-
tions embedded in the fiduciary relationship, so it is nowalso beneficial to explore how
the fiduciary plays out in contemporary contexts. This will start to the bring to the fore
the significantly wider contribution Fricker’s work can make to business ethics.
As highlighted in the previous section, one consequence of pre-emptive testimo-
nial injustice is that the epistemic agent receives a message that he or she is not fit
to participate in the practice that originally generates the very idea of a knower
practice. And if we consider the cumulative consequence of systematically receiv-
ing that message, then the result is that they come to consider themselves not fit to
participate—the message affects their agency. Put differently, they are repeatedly
disengaged from the decision-making process and, as a result, become apathetic and
are disempowered. As an epistemic agent whose thoughts, opinions, or judgements
are systematically not sought, and whose testimony is not seen as requisite or
necessary for consultation, then any capability or capacity to influence—any power
to determine decision-making—is removed. And, as a result of their exclusion from
the decision-making process over a sustained period of time, the epistemic agent
arguably comes to assume that he or she is, as Fricker notes, not fit to participate in
the practice and is in fact not a knower.
Looking to contemporary contexts for evidence of where this sort of repeated and
reinforced disengagement may exist—for examples of how beneficiaries have
become cumulatively disempowered due to their testimonies not being sought,
along with the long-term consequences of this exclusion—we can indeed find some
interesting examples.
4.2 Persistently Few Female Trustees
When we consider the cumulative effect of pre-emptive testimonial injustice in the
original familial context, where women were socially constructed as passive and
dependent beneficiaries, we start to develop an interesting insight into wider social
practice at play, including how the repeated message of not being fit to participate
still pervades present-day practice. This is particularly enlightening when we con-
sider the contemporary focus onwhy there is such a dearth of participation ofwomen
in senior leadership positions in organisations, that is, in senior management teams
or on boards, where such roles position them as trustees, with shareholders as
beneficiaries. It also elucidates why the finance sector continues to be male
dominated, with particular roles, such as investment managers3 and trustees of small
trusts—both of which have fiduciary duties at their core—having so few women
in position.4 When we take into account the normative power that cumulative
3See the Alpha Female Citywire (2018) report indicating that of 16,084 fund managers in its database,
only 1,662 (10.3 percent) were female.
4David O’Sullivan to Mark Potter, letter regarding feedback on the consultation on future of trusteeship
and governance, September 24, 2019, https://shareaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Pension-Regula
tor%E2%80%99s-consultation-on-trusteeship-and-governance.pdf: “The finance sector remains male-
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pre-emptive testimonial injustice has been shown to have on an epistemic agency,
alongside the sheer length of time that women have been precluded from assuming
positions of trusteeship, a new light is shone on this persistent issue. In short, in
professions where the fiduciary is prevalent, and in senior-level positions in orga-
nisations that constitute trusteeship, there is a strong gender bias to be found, often
along with highly masculinised organisational culture (McDowell 1997; Mussell
2018). The application of Fricker’s work, then, is invaluable in revealing how the
cumulative effects of systematic pre-emptive testimonial injustice embedded in the
fiduciary are playing out in contemporary international board rooms and beyond.
4.3 Shareholder Activism and Active Ownership as Pre-emptive Testimonial
Pushback
There is, however, another example of where the cumulative consequences of silenc-
ing the beneficiary are playing out, and in fact, there are signs of increasing discontent
at the disempowerment being imposed—signs of shareholder engagement and activ-
ism. Shareholder activism, or active ownership, takes many forms. It can involve a
solo shareholder with a significant number of shares working alone to try to influence
decision-making within the organisation he or she partly owns, or it can involve a
group of shareholders working together to likewise influence trustees.5 Shareholder
activism can also take place via a third party, that is, a trustee, such as a pension fund
manager, who is acting on beneficiaries’ behalf. In addition, the format the activism
takes varies, with some engagement taking place via private meetings (Coskun et al.
2018), whilst other activity is public, executed at shareholder meetings. Although the
agent configurations and format may vary, as indeed does the shareholders’ motiva-
tion for pursuing activism (i.e., financially motivated or non-financially motivated,
also known as social shareholder engagement [SSE] with the objective to advance
social and/or environmental issues; see Goodman and Arenas 2015; Cundill, Smart,
and Wilson 2018), the fundamental issue remains the same: the objective of share-
holder activism is to ensure the beneficiaries’voices are heard. It is to demand that their
thoughts, judgements, and opinions be un-silenced. It commands their consultation. It
transitions the beneficiary from the passive and subordinated position highlighted by
Richardson to one of an engaged agent, the implications of which are only now
becoming clear. As Lisa Fairfax (2019, 1301) writes,
the shift away from shareholder apathy reflects a radical departure from the traditional
corporate governance norm of shareholder passivity. While many corporate governance
experts have conceded the descriptive shift away from shareholder apathy (at least
temporarily), few have acknowledged the normative shift and its related significance.
dominated across the board; for example a study of small trusts in the UK found 84% of trustees are male. The
disconnect between trustee board priorities and the wider membership base is not surprising.” The author
references Smith (2014).
5 For an example of such group activity, see the recent activity of Amazon employees who recently used
their company-issued shares to propose a resolution asking the company to report on its plans to help tackle
climate change; see https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-employees-try-new-activism-shareholders/.
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This development in shareholder activism—both financially and non-financially
motivated—is particularly interesting in light of the application of Fricker’s theory
to the fiduciary, in which the beneficiaries’ silencing is theorised as pre-emptive
testimonial injustice. Indeed, by utilising this application, we can see how share-
holder activism can be read as shareholder pushback, rooted in issues concerning
epistemic injustice. The objective of the activism—irrespective of its motivation—is
to engage, to influence, and to empower beneficiaries, to move from testimonial
exclusion to inclusion, from injustice to justice.
It is particularly worth highlighting at this point, in the context of giving voice to
the previously voiceless, that the amount of shareholder activism varies according to
motivation, and this differential commands comment. Financially motivated share-
holder activism is more commonplace with a longer history, has propensity to take
place via private meetings, and has been studied more widely (Cundill, Smart, and
Wilson 2018). SSE, by comparison, is a relatively new phenomenon, has relatedly
been subject to less investigation, and takes place with less frequency. Its motivation
also often stands in contrast to that of financially motivated shareholder activism, a
point highlighted by Goodman and Arenas (2015, 163):
The shareholder primacy orientation of traditional agency theory assumes shareholders
will maximise their individual utility (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Social shareholder
engagement (SSE) poses a challenge to this approach, as shareholders bring the concerns
of often voiceless and marginalised stakeholders, such as victims of human rights abuses
and environmental degradation, to the heart of corporate decision making.
That it has taken time for SSE to gather ground should be of no surprise. Firstly,
and as Goodman and Arenas (2015) note, SSE poses a challenge to orthodox
economic theory that insists economic agents (caricatured in ideal types such as
homo economicus) will seek utility maximisation. As such, SSE sets out a similar
contest to that of socially responsible investments, in questioning these orthodox
premises, a challenge which has been commented on elsewhere (see Mussell 2018).
Secondly, as such economic premises have become embedded in widely held
beliefs, it has only been through relatively recent enquiry, including the Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer (2005) report, that the legal possibility of trustees being able to
take into account non-financial criteria in their fiduciary duty has become possible. It
is a considerable achievement that only fourteen years after the publication of the
Freshfields report, regulations came into effect on October 1, 2019, in the United
Kingdom requiring pension fund trustees to have a policy on how their investments
take into account environmental, social, and governance issues, including climate
change.6 And thirdly, the extent of shareholder ownership disconnect arguably plays
a central role in the “shareholder apathy” coined by Fairfax. The majority of
shareholders with institutional investments via pension funds do not know which
companies or industries their money is invested in. They have been, and still are,
6 See Shareaction press release on fiduciary duty: “Responsible Investment Regulations Come into Force
for Trustees,”October 1, 2019, https://shareaction.org/responsible-investment-regulations-come-into-force/.
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repeatedly disengaged from that information, precluded from consultation. And one
reason why they do not know, nor seek to become knowers, is arguably because they
have repeatedly received the message that they are not fit to participate in the
practice that originally generates the very idea of a knower practice.
4.4 Shareholder Activism: Refreshing the Fiduciary
What, then, in light of the application of Fricker’s theory of pre-emptive testimonial
injustice to the position of the silenced beneficiary, are the implications of increased
shareholder activism on the fiduciary relationship? What are the consequences of
this increased level of engagement, of this command to be consulted, on the asym-
metrical power dynamic embedded in the fiduciary? And how does this command to
be consulted disrupt the original presuppositions regarding beneficiary capabilities
upon which the fiduciary was originally premised?
As has previously been discussed, the effect of cumulative pre-emptive testimo-
nial injustice on an epistemic agent is the repeated delivery of the message that the
agent is not fit to participate in the practice that originally generates the very idea of
a knower practice. The consequence of that repeated delivery is to normalise the
message. That this has indeed been the outcome in the context of the beneficiary is
illustrated by Fairfax (2019, 1322), who writes,
Historically, governance experts pointed to the fact that shareholders were not active as
clear evidence that shareholders did not believe that they ought to be active. In this respect,
shareholder apathy itself served as the compelling evidence that shareholders had a
normative preference for apathy.
Later Fairfax added,
Some suggested that one reason for this continued embrace of apathy was shareholders’
continued belief that activism was not normatively appropriate. This means that the
apathy norm was so powerful that shareholders continued to embrace it even when such
embrace may not have been in their best interests (1323, emphasis added).
This observation in the context of shareholder activism is quite remarkable. It
clearly demonstrates the deep reach of pre-emptive testimonial injustice on the
beneficiary. This example also provides a valuable insight into the long-term effects
of systematic epistemic injustice on epistemic agents and the degree to which this
becomes embedded and normalised in behaviour. With this in mind, the fact that
shareholder activism is now gaining momentum carries even more weight, and to
recall Fairfax’s words, “few have acknowledged the normative shift and its related
significance”—particularly when we can now read it as pre-emptive testimonial
pushback.
When we add this observation to the earlier revelation regarding presuppositions
of the beneficiaries’ agential capabilities embedded in the fiduciary, we start to see a
more realist reassessment of those capabilities and a fundamental shift in the power
dynamic of the fiduciary relationship. Indeed, Fairfax’s (2019, 1345) article delivers
the conclusion that
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Shareholders and directors have come to accept the propriety of shareholder voice and
influence. They have come to believe that shareholders can and should play a role in
holding directors accountable and shaping corporate practices.
This inclusive approach, which appears to reject the previously outlined assump-
tions of beneficiaries’ credibility deficit, clearly marks a considerable change to the
original beliefs on which the familial fiduciary was premised and seemingly starts to
remedy the epistemic injustice identified as embedded in its original architecture. It
suggests that a challenge to the power dynamic of the trustee over the beneficiary is
gaining increasing momentum, potentially creating space for a rethink of the fidu-
ciary and related theory, a point to which I shortly return after firstly addressing
wider systemic implications.
4.5 Identifying Systemically Embedded Pre-emptive Testimonial Injustice
and the Reach of Fricker’s Contribution
As already noted, fiduciary has played, and continues to play, a fundamental role in
all financial and business organisations. It is a legal concept with a deep and long
history. The evolution of this concept over hundreds of years, and its appropriation
from use in familial to corporate law, has resulted in a great depth and breadth of its
use, and it is now fundamentally embedded in financial systems, institutions, and
organisations and sits at the core of the way in which they function. The fiduciary
steers and constrains decision-making. When its increasingly narrow economic
interpretation is used in conjunction with supposedly shareholder-centric theory,
such as the shareholder primacy model—“supposedly” because the latter has clearly
failed to identify the systematic silencing and exclusion of the beneficiary that sits at
the centre of its structure—we can start to see how the identified epistemic injustice,
of not being sought and being silenced, has resulted in a fundamental fault in the
system, delivering an epistemic disjuncture. We have agents acting on behalf of
principals without engaging them in consultation, whilst applying particular eco-
nomic reasoning with which the principal may well not concur, and principals
largely assuming that they are not fit to participate.
When we take into account the exhaustive use of the fiduciary as a legal device, in
conjunction with the outlined identification of pre-emptive testimonial injustice being
embedded in its fundamental structure, we can start to clearly bring to the fore the
extent to which existing financial systems, institutions, and organisations have this
injustice firmly embedded within them. Another example of this in play is the highly
stratified structure of current financial systems, with increasing layers of (often highly
lucrative) fiduciary intermediaries further separating beneficiaries from trustees,
another layer of “expert trustees” reinforcing the message that beneficiaries are not
fit to participate in the process. This increasingly complex intermediary issue is
discussed in greater detail elsewhere, specifically in the context of how potential
solutions using blockchain technology for corporate governance potentially facilitate
shareholders voting directly (Yermack 2017; Van der Elst and Lafarre 2019).
That inequalities and injustices exist in financial and corporate institutions is not
of course a situation that has gone unnoticed. Too many authors to mention here,
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from disciplines spanning political economy, development studies, gender studies,
business ethics, international relations, and so on, have visited this arena before. But
explicit connections between recognised inequalities and injustices being pin-
pointed to the fiduciary arrangement embedded in these institutions are limited.
That it is cumulative pre-emptive testimonial injustice in the fiduciary relationship—
which to recall is premised on an unequal power distribution—giving rise to such
injustice and inequality, is overlooked. This situation should come as no surprise
when we consider how entrenched the legal device of the fiduciary has become,
undoubtedly owing to its enormous success (inmonetary terms) of expanding global
capitalism and financial markets, via facilitating remote shareholder ownership and
financial investments. It simply exists all around us. It is a legal device, a mechanism
that has a long history of service and use, and as a result, it now sits in the shadows of
the systems it serves, a tried, tested, and trusted tool.
That the fiduciary often escapes the analytical eye outside of legal studies, even
when the author specialises in issues relating to injustice, gender, and finance,
evidences how elusive the concept can be. Providing a clear example will be helpful.
In her excellent and otherwise comprehensive book The Gendering of Global
Finance, Libby Assassi (2009) delivers a helpful and detailed account of how
contemporary financial institutions and systems are imbued with gender inequality.
And in her introduction, she specifically draws attention to systemic issues, writing
that “the possibility of gendered and subordinating structures being present in the
workings of global finance is an area which has been consistently overlooked” (2).
Tracing the shift from feudalism to capitalism, the emergence of credit and financial
institutions, and the rise of global financial markets, she draws out the gender
inequalities that permeate the process she describes. Yet, despite the in-depth
discussion she outlines, including a chapter titled “Property and Gender: Irrational
Women and Rational Men,” no focus on the fiduciary unfolds. It is absent from the
analysis. There is no mention of the beneficiary as subordinated in the structure of
the fiduciary relationship and no discussion that the fiduciary is a gendered and
subordinating structure present in the workings of global finance. The injustice
embedded in the fiduciary is seemingly out of view even from those who set out
to seek it.
4.6 Familiar but Flawed: Is the Fiduciary Future-Fit?
Now that the fiduciary has been identified as being premised on pre-emptive
testimonial injustice, with problematic cumulative effects, and the extent to which
this embedded injustice has gone undiscovered—even by primed eyes—has been
noted, how then to move forward? What options are available to correct this
injustice? Here it would be helpful to refer back to Assassi, who in turn draws on
prior thinking regarding proposed remedies for dealing with identified systemic
exclusion, silencing, and injustice. Shewrites that “Nannerl Keohane once famously
stated ‘In women’s studies, a good piece of conventional wisdom holds that it is
simply not enough to “add women and stir”’ (Keohane 1982, 87). In terms of the
gendered construction of financial markets, it too has to be said, it is simply not
enough to ‘add women and stir’” (Assassi 2009, 130).
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Can the same wisdom work in this situation? Can we simply “add shareholders
and stir”?Will this accommodate the “propriety of shareholder voice and influence”
that, according to Fairfax, both shareholders and directors have come to accept? In a
normative fiduciary relationship, premised on an asymmetrical power dynamic of
trustees/directors dominating beneficiaries/shareholders, where cumulative pre-
emptive testimonial injustice has normalised the silencing of billions of shareholders
(and other beneficiaries), is it really possible to retain that same injustice-inducing
structure to accommodate the “new belief” that “shareholders can and should play a
role in holding directors accountable”? If the now identified injustice in the fidu-
ciary, and its ensuing implications for further injustice, has been so deeply embedded
in its structure as to go unnoticed, then how deeply embedded is the thinking that the
trustee truly knows best and beneficiaries need not be consulted? What latitude
exists in the current arrangement for shareholders really to hold directors account-
able?We have already seen the extent to which the gendered origins of the fiduciary
arrangement have had a long-term normative effect and are deeply entrenched in
financial systems and institutions, resulting in a highly masculinised institutional
culture (McDowell 1997) and a dearth of women’s voices in trustee positions, and
what the silencing effect that cumulative pre-testimonial injustice has had on the
engagement of shareholders as beneficiaries. When the existing legal device has
consistently delivered the message that shareholders are not fit to participate in the
practice that originally generates the very idea of a knower practice, is it really
viable to suggest that shareholders can now be told their voice matters and that these
can now simply be added to the existing processes, systems, and structures that have
evolved around their exclusion? Or is it time, now that the epistemic injustice hidden
in the fiduciary has been called out of the shadows, to challenge if it is in fact future-
fit? Whilst others may advocate that “fiduciary law must be repaired before it can
properly carry out its role in regulating financial entrustment and management”
(Getzler 2014), the preceding analysis revealing the epistemic injustice embedded in
the fiduciary dynamic could arguably preclude that possibility.
The increasingly inclusive and accepting approach highlighted by Fairfax could
potentially make way for the development of a new arrangement, an alternative
conceptualisation of the fiduciary—an arrangement in which the trustee and benefi-
ciary are situated in a more active and consultative relationship, one that moves away
from the obscurity caused by beneficiaries being cast in an archaic passive role, a
reconceptualisation that moves away from the passive rhetoric of beneficiary rights
that require “protection” towards a refocus on their active ownership, along with the
relational responsibilities towards the natural world and wider society that this entails.
5. CONCLUSION
This article has fundamentally delivered an ethical project, one that starts to demon-
strate the breadth of contribution that Miranda Fricker’s work can make to business
ethics. Applying Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice to elucidate the position of the
silenced beneficiary in the fiduciary relationship has highlighted the implications of
long-term pre-emptive testimonial injustice and demonstrated the far-reaching effect
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this has had on limiting the agency of beneficiaries. By doing so, the project has been
able to shed light on why there are so few females in positions of trusteeship and on
why beneficiaries have been reticent in being active shareholders—remaining widely
disengaged and silent. The article has also revealed the breadth and depth of the scale
to which epistemic injustice is built into our current financial architecture because of
the embeddedness of this legal concept in current financial systems and structures—
again reiterating the wide potential of Fricker’s work in a business ethics context.
As one generation uses and appropriates concepts from its predecessors, so the
history of the development of those concepts is forgotten. The socioeconomic
contexts that helped shape the concepts’ development become embedded, rendered
implicit, as more contemporary applications of the concept take centre stage.
The objective of analysing the concept of the fiduciarywith Fricker’swork has been
to rediscover and reinterpret its ethical narrative, to show how fiduciary’s power
dynamic, originally built on dubious gender stereotypes and epistemic injustice, is
increasingly coming under challenge to refresh and develop into a future-fit fiduciary.
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